

Message Text

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64

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

NEA-10 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 IO-12 OIC-04 ACDA-19

AEC-11 RSR-01 /154 W

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R 031706 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8101

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 2609

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM IT

SUBJECT: MBFR: ITALIAN VIEWS ON PARTICIPATION AND RECESS

REF: ROME 2010

1. IN RECENT DISCUSSION ON MBFR DEVELOPMENTS IN VIENNA, FONOFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR DISARMAMENT OFFICE INDICATED ITALIAN PREFERENCES
FOR RESOLUTION OF PARTICIPATION QUESTION. OF CURRENT POSSIBIL-
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ITIES BEING AIRED IN QUADRILATERAL MEETINGS, FONOFF IS ATTRACTED TO 19-11 COOPTATION IDEA CHIEFLY BECAUSE IT TAKES THE PRESSURE OFF HUNGARY (AND CONSEQUENTLY ITALY) WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY LEAVING DOOR SLIGHTLY AJAR TO HUNGARIAN INCLUSION AMONG DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AT LATER DATE. HOWEVER ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR THIS FORMULA WOULD BE STRICTLY CONDITIONAL ON TWO POINTS:

A) INITIATIVE FOR COOPTATION MUST COME FIRST FROM COOPTIVE STATE, B) ONLY THEN WOULD CONSENSUS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COME INTO PLAY. FONOFF FEELS THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD BOTH PROTECT FLANK COUNTRIES AND GUARD AGAINST WIDER PARTICIPATION SOUGHT BY SOVIETS. IN ITALIAN VIEW, THIS FO 02 OF 02 032141 Z

THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION ON LIMITING CENTRAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS? THE ANSWER I DERIVE IS AS FOLLOWS. YOU APPARENTLY CONSIDER THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT DEALING WITH ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS HAVE " RESOLVED" THE ARMS LIMITATIONS PROBLEM IN THESE

TWO AREAS. AT THE SAME TIME, YOU HAVE MADE AN EXTREME PROPOSAL THAT HEAVY BOMBERS NOT CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THUS ELIMINATING THEIR VALUE IN A DETERRENT ROLE. WHEN I TRANSLATE THESE SOVIET POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS INTO CONCRETE TERMS, I FIND THE SOVIET POSITION ON A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WOULD ALLOW FOR A

FINAL TOTAL OF ABOUT 1400 ICBM LAUNCHERS FOR THE USSR COMPARED TO ABOUT 1000 FOR THE US, AND ROUGHLY 1000 SLBM LAUNCHERS OF ALL TYPES FOR THE USSR COMPARED TO ABOUT 700 FOR THE US. IN THE MEANTIME, ALL HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE STRATEGIC EQUATION BY YOUR

PROPOSAL THAT THEY NOT CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ALLOWED IN EXCESS OF 300 HEAVY ICBMS, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. I DO NOT FIND THIS PROPOSITION COPATIBLE WITH EQUAL SECURITY, WITH ESSENTIAL EQUIVALANCE, OR WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE. IN FACT I FIND THIS SUCH A ONE- SIDED POSITION AS TO QUESTION HOW IT CAN POSSIBLY CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

IN ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THERE MUST BE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. I STRONGLY URGE THE SOVIET SIDE TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE US SIDE DEALING WITH EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON THOSE SYSTEMS MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. JOHNSON

SECRET

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EUR
LISBON

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